Drive-by download attacks force users to automatically download and install malware by redirecting them to malicious URLs that exploit vulnerabilities of the user's web browser. In addition, several evasion techniques, such as code obfuscation and environment-dependent redirection, are used in combination with drive-by download attacks to prevent detection. In environment-dependent redirection, attackers profile the information on the user's environment, such as the name and version of the browser and browser plugins, and launch a drive-by download attack on only certain targets by changing the destination URL. When malicious content detection and collection techniques, such as honeyclients, are used that do not match the specific environment of the attack target, they cannot detect the attack because they are not redirected. Therefore, it is necessary to improve analysis coverage while countering these adversarial evasion techniques. We propose a method for exhaustively analyzing JavaScript code relevant to redirections and extracting the destination URLs in the code. Our method facilitates the detection of attacks by extracting a large number of URLs while controlling the analysis overhead by excluding code not relevant to redirections. We implemented our method in a browser emulator called MineSpider that automatically extracts potential URLs from websites. We validated it by using communication data with malicious websites captured during a three-year period. The experimental results demonstrated that MineSpider extracted 30,000 new URLs from malicious websites in a few seconds that conventional methods missed. key words: drive-by download, web-based malware, code analysis, redirection analysis
Introduction
Within the last five years, the World Wide Web has become the primary vector for malware infections. Attackers lure victims to visit compromised websites or entice them to click on malicious links through social engineering. These victims are redirected to malicious websites that exploit their browsers and/or browser plugins and trick them into downloading and running malware [2] . This kind of attack is called a "drive-by download attack". Attackers launch this attack with several evasion techniques, such as redirection chain, code obfuscation, environment-dependent redirection, to prevent detection. A noticeable feature of drive-by download attacks is the abuse of browser fingerManuscript received May 28, 2015 . Manuscript revised October 9, 2015. Manuscript publicized January 13, 2016 . † The authors are with NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Musashino-shi, 180-8585 Japan.
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a) E-mail: takata.yuta@lab.ntt.co.jp DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2015ICP0013 printing code that is usually used by benign websites to profile the client environment such as the browser and browser plugins [3] . Attackers prevent any disclosure of malicious objects, such as an exploit code and malware, by changing the destination URL based on the browser fingerprint and by launching attacks only on certain targets. Furthermore, these attack techniques are increasing in complexity and becoming increasingly automated by exploit kits [4] - [6] . Infected clients are negatively affected by damage, such as data leakage and financial loss, because the attacker can gain control of the client system. In addition, attackers accelerate the malware infection cycle by compromising websites managed by the infected client. These websites are then integrated into a drive-by download attack scheme [7] . Many detection and prevention methods have been proposed to deal with these increasingly sophisticated drive-by download attacks. For example, some methods detect downloads of executables by crawling websites using a honeyclient [8] - [11] , whereas others use static analysis methods to detect the characteristics of exploit code such as strings and program structures [12] - [14] . Researchers have also proposed dynamic analysis methods to detect malicious behavior observed while monitoring abuses of browser and plugin functions [15] - [17] . These conventional methods, however, detect drive-by downloads by crawling and analyzing websites with a specific environment. In other words, these methods cannot follow redirections to malicious URLs if attackers do not carry out an attack because of the fingerprint of the environment. That is to say, these methods cannot access malicious websites that contain exploit code and executable files. On the other hand, many researchers have proposed code analysis methods to improve URL coverage [3] , [18] . Although these methods can extract more URLs, the scalability of the implementation is limited because they are implemented in a real browser [3] or in the original JavaScript interpreter that has no implementation for browser plugins [18] . If environment information, such as the browser version number and plugin version number, is used in a URL, this method can only extract a URL for that specific environment.
In this paper, we propose a method for extracting code relevant to redirections independently of the analysis environment. This method analyzes JavaScript that contains browser fingerprinting code and redirection code and extracts potential URLs by executing the extracted redirection code. More precisely, our method extracts execution paths Copyright c 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers relevant to redirection code as code fragments by applying program slicing to JavaScript. Finally, it executes the extracted code fragments with a JavaScript interpreter then extracts URLs used in the redirection code. We implemented our method in a browser emulator that can emulate an arbitrary browser and arbitrary browser plugins, which we call MineSpider. MineSpider successfully extracted a large number of highly malicious URLs from malicious websites that were previously detected as drive-by downloads. The experimental results demonstrated that MineSpider extracted 30,000 new URLs in a few seconds that conventional methods did not discover.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on drive-by download attacks and defines the research problem. In Sect. 3, we introduce our proposed method, and in Sect. 4, we explain the experiment and the results used to evaluate the method. A discussion and limitations of our method are given in Sects. 5 and 6, respectively. We discuss related work in Sect. 7 and conclude the paper in Sect. 8.
Drive-by Download Attack and Evasion Technique

Redirection Chain
Figure 1 depicts a malware infection based on a drive-by download attack. The landing URL, which starts a driveby download attack, redirects the user to the exploit URL via multiple redirection URLs using JavaScript. The user is forced to execute exploit code that targets vulnerabilities in browsers at the exploit URL and to download and install malware from the malware distribution URL without the user's consent. In addition, attackers trick security researchers and vendors by redirecting the user to a benign URL rather than to an exploit URL to circumvent detection. This is shown in the gray area in Fig. 1 .
The methods for redirecting users to different URLs in a redirection chain can be divided into two types: URL reference and document object model (DOM) manipulation. The former type uses code that refers to a URL, and the latter type uses code containing HTML tags (DOM elements) that refer to a URL. These kinds of redirection code use the JavaScript functions and properties listed in Table 1 . The URL reference code redirects a user to a URL that is used in an argument of a function or an assignment value of a property. The DOM manipulation code inserts a DOM element that refers to a URL that is used as an attribute value of an HTML tag such as iframe, frame, script, embed, applet, object, and meta. The HTML tags that do not refer explicitly to a URL are also used in the DOM manipulation code. Thus, the use of the DOM manipulation code cannot be determined without executing the code. A driveby download attack redirects users to exploit URLs while evading detection by inserting hidden HTML tags or modifying the destination URL.
Code Obfuscation
Attackers prevent signature-based detection by heavily obfuscating code used for redirection and exploitation [4] . Code obfuscation is generally used for code protection against reverse engineering and tampering. The example code in Fig. 2 shows the result of code obfuscation by a public JavaScript compressor † . JavaScript function eval() executes an argument string as JavaScript. Therefore, this code finally executes the original DOM manipulation code by repeatedly splitting and joining the argument string. Figure 3 shows the structure and components of a typical malicious obfuscated code. The deobfuscation triggers, such as eval(), setInterval(), and setTimeout(), unpack the obfuscated code (malicious payloads) in the gray area using the deobfuscation code and executes it. In Fig. 2 , deobfuscation code and trigger are the argument string and eval() 
Fig. 4
Environment-dependent redirection code. This code first identifies the Java version of the user's client using PluginDetect at line 1. Next, it redirects the user to different malicious URLs, depending on the Java version, from lines 5 to 12. The user is also redirected to the benign URL when the Java version does not correspond to the attack target at line 14. function, respectively.
Environment-Dependent Redirection
In addition to redirection chain and code obfuscation, attackers identify the user's environment information, such as the name and version of the browser and browser plugins, by using browser fingerprinting, and they change the destination URL depending on the acquired fingerprint to circumvent detection. Browser fingerprinting, which is a method for profiling the environment of the client that visits the website, is generally used for user tracking and downloading of web content according to the environment. Attackers prevent any disclosure of malicious objects by redirecting a specific user to a malicious URL based on the user browser's fingerprint. These techniques to circumvent detection, as mentioned above, are used frequently in an attack automation tool known as an exploit kit. Exploit kits contain various exploit codes and can automatically build malicious websites for a wide range of environments as attack targets [5] . Grier et al. [6] reported that half of all malicious websites were deployed using exploit kits.
The example code in Fig. 4 shows the behavior of redirection code that changes the destination URL depending on the environment (environment-dependent redirection code). This code identifies the version of Java using PluginDetect † , which is a framework for browser fingerprinting. The user is redirected to a URL after the execution of the branch statement based on the acquired environment information. In Fig. 4 , the user is redirected to the malicious URL if Java is installed in the environment, and the user is redirected to the benign URL if Java is not installed in the environment.
Exploit kits also frequently use the environment-dependent redirection code and change the destination URL [5] . We found through manual inspections that typical exploit kits, such as Blackhole and Styx, change the destination URL using 2.5 URLs on average. More details are presented in Sect. 4 .5.
When we analyze websites with an environment not targeted by the attack, it is impossible to detect any exploit code or malware since it cannot be redirected to malicious URLs. To reduce the number of false negatives, security researchers and engineers must maximize the disclosure of malicious objects. In this paper, we propose a method for extracting redirection code from environmentdependent redirection code independently of the analysis environment to mine more potential URLs that lead to malicious objects. Since most redirection code is obfuscated and the URL is embedded in the code, our method analyzes the deobfuscated code after unpacking the obfuscated code by dynamic execution. Thus, the aim with our proposed method is not to detect but to extract potential URLs; hence, it must be able to further analyze the extracted results. We argue that a combination of our method and conventional detection/prevention methods [8] - [16] can improve the number of detected malicious URLs hidden behind the redirection URLs.
Methodology
We propose a method for extracing redirection code independently of the analysis environment. This method also extracts URLs contained in the code by executing extracted redirection code. The analysis process of the proposed method is provided in Fig. 5 . First, this method divides fetched web content into an HTML document and JavaScript. Then, a DOM tree is built from the HTML document, and an abstract syntax tree (AST) is constructed from the JavaScript. Next, redirection code in Table 1 is identified from the extracted JavaScript through syntax analysis using the AST. If the identified code used some variables, this method extracts a code fragment (a slice) to resolve values of the variables by program slicing using a program dependence graph (PDG). Moreover, this method generates some slices that can cover all execution paths when an extracted slice includes multiple execution paths. Finally, URLs are extracted by executing extracted slices with the DOM tree.
3.1 Build DOM Tree and Extract JavaScript First, our method extracts an HTML document and JavaScript from web content that is fetched by accessing a URL. A DOM tree is then constructed by parsing the HTML document. JavaScript is categorized into two groups: statically included JavaScript code and dynamically included JavaScript code. The former consists of web content enclosed by the script tag, web content of a URL that is used as the src attribute of the script tag, or web content embedded in the attribute value "javascript:" of an HTML tag. In contrast, the latter refers to strings that are used in an argument of JavaScript functions such as eval(), setInterval(), and setTimeout(). This code also corresponds to the deobfuscated code after unpacking the obfuscated code in Sect. 2.2. Section 3.6 gives further information about the handling of dynamically included JavaScript code. In this study, we analyzed both statically and dynamically included JavaScript code in web content.
Convert to Abstract Syntax Tree
Next, our method identifies redirection code from extracted JavaScript code through static syntax analysis using an AST. An AST represents an abstract tree model of an entire program. We can exhaustively analyze a certain program structure, such as a function call statement in a branch statement, by using an AST traversal. For example, we can determine that two location.replace() in Table 1 are used as function call statements by traversing the AST of the code in Fig. 4 . Therefore, we can identify redirection code independently of its control flow, which is the order in which statements are executed, by converting extracted JavaScript to AST and traversing it. However, accurate URLs cannot be extracted from identified code because some variables are used in the code (e.g., the variable b url is used in the argument of the function at line 16 in Fig. 4 ). The details of extracting code fragments that affect the identified code are presented in the following sections.
Construct Program Dependence Graph and Extract Slices
In this section, we describe how to extract code fragments by using program slicing to resolve variables used in redirection code. Program slicing [19] is a technique for extracting a set of statements affecting a variable v at the point of an arbitrary statement s, which is called a slicing criterion of the form <s, v>. A set of statements that is extracted according to a slicing criterion is called a slice. To extract slices relevant to the redirection code identified in the previous section, our method defines the functions and properties listed in Table 1 as slicing criteria. General program slicing requires high accuracy in the slicing process so that programmers can use it for software verification and debugging. The objective of this study, however, was to extract concrete URLs by executing extracted slices based on slicing criteria on websites. Therefore, it is necessary to extract slices that are as small as possible and to execute them in a short time. In other words, we must extract statements that are directly related to a slicing criterion as a slice and exclude statements that are indirectly related to a slicing criterion. Therefore, we perform program slicing on a PDG, which represents dependencies between statements. A PDG is a directed graph using control dependencies and data dependencies between statements in a program.
Control Dependence: Statement q is control dependent on statement p if p is a branch statement, and the execution result of p determines whether q will be executed.
Data Dependence: Statement q is data dependent on statement p if the definition of variable v in p can affect any value in q and the affected value in q cannot be modified by any statement between p and q in the execution path.
A PDG represents each statement in a program as a node and constructs control dependencies and data dependencies between nodes as edges. We show the result of converting the code of Fig. 4 to a PDG in Fig. 6 . Program slicing can extract nodes as a slice by traversing edges of control dependencies and data dependencies using a PDG. There are two types of traversal methods, which are categorized according to the direction: a forward slice and a backward slice. The forward slice can extract nodes affected by S N ← φ, DN ← φ 10: end if 11: 12: // Traverse backward cd-edges once 13 a slicing criterion by traversing forward edges. The backward slice can extract nodes affecting a slicing criterion by traversing backward edges. In this paper, we use a backward slice to resolve a variable value.
General program slicing extracts slices by recursively traversing all dependencies. Our method, however, extracts slices by traversing control dependencies only once, rather than traversing recursively to avoid extracting nodes indirectly relevant to a slicing criterion (implicit nodes). The algorithm for backward slicing is described in Algorithm 1. To start with, it recursively traverses only data dependencies to extract only nodes directly relevant to a slicing criterion (explicit nodes). Next, only nodes that are control dependent on explicit nodes are extracted by traversing control dependencies only once. For example, when we define the node of line 13 in the PDG of Fig. 6 as a slicing criterion, we can extract nodes of lines 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 using Algorithm 1. To reduce the time our method takes to analyze slice computation and execution, we limited the size of extracted slices.
The extracted slice may contain multiple execution paths because it contains conditional branch nodes that are control dependent on explicit nodes. Simple execution of the extracted slice means an extraction of only one URL. Therefore, our method extracts multiple slices with each execution path by analyzing the extracted slice to exhaustively extract URLs.
Explore Execution Paths
When an extracted slice contains some branch statements, our method parses the extracted slice to extract more slices with each execution path. For example, three slices are generated from the original slice, the slicing criterion of which is line 13 in Fig. 4 by execution path exploration, because the original slice contains two if statement nodes of lines 7 and 10. After the execution path exploration, these conditional branch nodes are eliminated to execute the slice. Although execution path exploration can extract slices independently of branch statements, the number of extracted slices increases exponentially with the addition of branch statements contained in a slice. For example, when a slice contains if statements written in series, not nested, 2 N i f slices are generated, with N i f being the number of if statements. This results in a trade-off between analysis time and analysis coverage. In this paper, we limited the number of branch statements for execution path exploration to avoid this exponential explosion. In addition, we cannot identify whether the extracted slice contains a URL without executing it. For this reason, we also limit the number of slicing criteria for analysis so that the analysis process is not disturbed by websites containing many slicing criteria.
Execute Slices
Finally, when our method executes extracted slices, URLs are extracted by monitoring arguments of the functions and assignment values of the properties in Table 1 . Then, our method clones the context information (e.g., variable definitions and function definitions) of JavaScript necessary for executing a slice and deletes it afterwards without any side effects on the original JavaScript executions.
In summary, the algorithm of the entire analysis process is indicated as Algorithm 2. First, when traversing the extracted AST, a PDG is constructed and an AST subtree is extracted and held as a slicing criterion if it corresponds to the code in Table 1 . Next, our method extracts slices using Algorithm 1 with slicing criteria and the PDG after the AST traversal. When a slice contains branch statements, some slices are generated with each execution path of the slice by execution path exploration. Finally, our method executes extracted slices using a JavaScript interpreter with the DOM tree that was built after eliminating conditional branch nodes. As a result, URLs are extracted by monitoring the functions and properties in Table 1 .
Implementation
We implemented the proposed method in an open source browser emulator, HtmlUnit † , to create a system that automatically extracts potential URLs from websites. We call this system MineSpider. The HtmlUnit, which was used in a previous study [16] , can parse an HTML document and statically included JavaScript code from fetched Web content. The extracted HTML document is then automatically converted to a DOM tree. As mentioned earlier, dynamically included JavaScript code is also extracted as JavaScript by hooking functions, such as eval(), setInterval(), and setTimeout(), using HtmlUnit. In other words, obfuscated JavaScript code is also included in an analysis through the extraction of deobfuscated argument strings. MineSpider uses Rhino † , the JavaScript interpreter of HtmlUnit, to convert JavaScript to an AST and traverse it. MineSpider identifies slicing criteria and constructs a PDG by traversing the extracted AST and extracts redirection code as slices by program slicing using Algorithm 1. When an extracted slice contains branch statements, such as if/else or switch/case, slices are generated with each execution path by converting the slice to an AST again and parsing it. MineSpider then executes the slices using Rhino. Finally, MineSpider extracts URLs and sets controls preventing access to these URLs by monitoring JavaScript function calls and the DOM tree changes in extracted slice executions.
Experiment and Evaluation
Although the proposed method can extract URLs that cannot be extracted by conventional methods, it introduces an overhead in JavaScript analysis. We therefore discuss in this section our evaluation of the number of URLs extracted and analyzed using the proposed method.
Datasets
In this experiment, we used HTTP communication data obtained with a high-interaction honeyclient Marionette [9] , [10] that crawled public URL blacklists † †, † † † and commercial URL blacklists. To preprocess this communication data, we prepared an HTTP replay server that responds to a request with web content based on a URL. MineSpider evaluated the web content in the data by sending requests based on the seed URLs to the replay server. The data used in this experiment were communication data with 19,899 landing URLs captured during the three-year period from 2011 to 2014 and containing one or more slicing criteria for each crawl of the landing URLs.
Environmental Setup
We prepared HtmlUnit without making any changes as a conventional low-interaction honeyclient system and compared it with MineSpider. Both systems emulate Internet Explorer 6 on Windows XP SP2 as an analysis environment and arbitrary versions of Java Runtime Environment (JRE), Acrobat PDF, and Flash Player as browser plugins. In addition, we empirically determined the following heuristic values to reduce the time our proposed method takes to analyze JavaScript:
• The slice size for extraction was limited to 128 KB.
• The number of slicing criteria was limited to 20.
• The number of branch statements for execution path exploration was limited to 5.
The slice size and number of slicing criteria were set to not exceed the above values in approximately 80% of crawls for maintaining the completeness of URL extraction. We set the number of branch statements for execution path exploration to five because we found that a typical exploit kit contains from three to four conditional redirection codes on average in the preliminary manual inspections of Sect. 4.5.
We obtained the experimental results presented in this section using two computers, both running Ubuntu 12.01. One computer (2.93-GHz processor and 24-GB RAM) replayed the communication data, and the other (3.16-GHz processor and 4-GB RAM) ran both the systems and evaluated web content. † † "Malware Domain List," http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/ † † † Malwarebytes, "hpHosts," http://www.hosts-file.net/ 
Extracting URLs from Web Content
We list the number of extracted unique URLs and the crawling time of the conventional system and MineSpider in Table 2 . We defined the term "URL" as a string starting from "http://" or "https://" and excluded "file://" and "javascript://". Table 2 indicates that MineSpider extracted more than 30,000 new URLs that the conventional system missed. The crawling time of MineSpider was approximately two times longer than that of the conventional system. While MineSpider requires some analysis overhead, it can extract URLs that the conventional system cannot extract. In addition, the number of URLs extracted with MineSpider decreased by approximately 1,000 URLs when MineSpider did not emulate browser plugins, although the crawling time did not change. This result shows that it is important to have various browser plugin emulations to obtain more URLs. After extracting the URLs, we further matched them with the public signatures †, † † of characteristic URLs used in typical exploit kits and our original signatures of Table 3 generated through manual inspections to examine whether URLs extracted with MineSpider were obviously malicious. In the dataset, URLs contained in 14,998 (75.3%) crawls matched these two signatures. As a result, MineSpider extracted URLs contained in 13,991 (70.3%) crawls that matched the signatures. On the other hand, the conventional system extracted URLs contained in 12,052 (60.6%) crawls that matched the signatures. Examples of matched exploit kits included Angler, RedKit, Blackhole, Styx, SweetOrange, NuclearPack, Cool, CritxPack, and FlashPack. Although about 6,000 crawls did not match, we found through manual inspections that most of these URLs were maliciously generated by exploit kits that were not included in the signatures or malicious websites that use custom exploit codes or executable files without exploit kits. In total, the matched URLs that could not be extracted with the conventional system but could be extracted with MineSpider were contained in 1,939 (9.7%) crawls. These results show that MineSpider can extract more URLs with high levels of maliciousness than the conventional system. 
Analysis Coverage for Extracting URLs
With our proposed method, program slicing is effective for variable resolution and execution path exploration is effective for multi-path executions. For example, in Fig. 4 , program slicing and execution path exploration are necessary to resolve the variable arg of the slicing criterion at line 13 and to analyze all execution paths of the slice, respectively. In other words, slicing criteria (the identified redirection codes) can be divided into two types: code that contains some Variable parts and code that has only Constant parts. The extracted slices also can be categorized into two types: those that have branch statements (MultiplePaths) and those without branch statements (S inglePath). To evaluate the analysis coverage of URL extraction carried out by program slicing and execution path exploration, we summarize the results of the total number of extracted URLs for each slice classification in Table 4 . We can see from the table that half of the identified redirection codes contain some variables. This means that dynamic variable resolution by program slicing enables MineSpider to extract more complete URLs than static approaches, e.g., regular expressions. Table 2 include malicious websites using exploit kits, such as RedKit, or custom exploit codes without any variation in the number of URLs, the number of new URLs extracted with MineSpider is validated.
Performance Overhead
We evaluated the average preprocessing time (AST traversal time and PDG construction time), slice computation time (backward slicing time and path exploration time), and slice evaluation time used with the proposed method. The results indicated that these time costs were 1.188, 4.206, and 0.796 sec, respectively, and that slice computation was the most time-consuming process. The above results are the average times required to compute 240,807 slicing criteria for URL extractions. In this experiment, we excluded 139,740 slicing criteria and 85,068 slices from the analysis objects by limiting the number of slicing criteria and the slice size to reduce the analysis time. However, no URLs were embedded in any of the excluded objects because we cannot identify whether a DOM manipulation code in Table 1 refers to a URL unless the code is executed, as we described previously. We found in a manual inspection that most of the excluded objects were parts of benign code, such as JavaScript API provided from SNSs, or advertisements and JavaScript library such as jQuery or Prototype. To further reduce the analysis time, we need to optimize our method by tuning the heuristic values.
Discussion
Identification of Plugins Relevant to Redirection
If we can identify environment information, such as the name and version of the browser and browser plugins that is relevant to redirections, we can effectively identify an environment to be prepared for analysis using conventional methods such as a honeyclient. Therefore, we discuss in this section our experimental investigation of environment information relevant to redirections to the extracted URLs by applying the proposed method. Our focus in this experiment was plugins (Java, PDF, and Flash) with which MineSpider emulates the arbitrary versions; hence, we identified the plugins relevant to redirections. More precisely, this involves defining branch statements included in the extracted slices as new slicing criteria and extracting the code relevant to browser fingerprinting by applying program slicing of the proposed method just as in the URL extraction. When the extracted browser fingerprinting code is executed, our method detects the usage of the plugins by hooking the JavaScript functions, such as String object functions and DOM manipulation functions, and by monitoring the version number of the plugins in these arguments. In addition, a method that uses the file extensions of the extracted URLs (.jar, .pdf, and .swf) and a method that uses HTML tag information and the attribute value used in the DOM manipulation code of Table 1 (e.g., a Content-Type value that is used as the type attribute of the object tag) are also general methods to identify the plugins relevant to redirections. We evaluated the plugin identification obtained by applying the proposed method compared with the plugin identification obtained with a file extension and an HTML tag in this experiment. Table 6 lists the number of plugin-dependent redirections discovered during crawling as well as the breakdown of each plugin. We define the number of plugins that can be identified by program slicing as S lice, by HTML tag as T ag, and by file extension as Extension. We can see from the table that approximately 36.5% of the crawls use plugin-dependent redirection code. These results also show that most of the plugins relevant to redirections are identified by S lice, and S lice overlaps T ag and Extension. However, T ag can identify Java and Flash as well as S lice, but cannot identify PDF. This means that attackers tend to refer to a PDF file in an HTML tag, such as iframe and frame tags for documents, rather than an HTML tag, such as an object tag or embed tag for multimedia, depending on the browser support. Extension can identify Flash to some degree, but cannot identify Java and PDF. This trend is due to the usage of a URL that uses a file extension not relevant to plugins (e.g., .cgi and .php) and a URL that does not include an extension. Figure 7 shows the usage rate of plugins in plugindependent redirections within each quarter. In the figure, we can see that the percentage of Java and PDF was high from 2012Q4 to 2013Q4, and Flash was high from 2014Q1. This indicates a changing trend in plugins profiled by browser fingerprinting. Interestingly, the security vendor's report [20] shows a correlation with the changing trend in vulnerabilities used in exploit kits in the data we collected.
T ag and Extension do not require any analysis overhead; only S lice does. The average slice computation time and slice evaluation time to identify plugins was 2.355 and 0.542 sec, respectively. While S lice also requires only a little overhead, just like the URL extraction in Sect. 4.3, it can identify plugins relevant to redirections more effectively than T ag and Extension can.
Recursive Extracted URL Access
The experiment described in Sect. 4.3 used only HTTP communication data that had been detected in an attack by using a high-interaction honeyclient in advance. This means that web content of URLs newly extracted with the proposed method was not evaluated. Therefore, more URLs can be extracted by fetching the web content based on the newly extracted URLs and analyzing them using the proposed method in the future.
Evasion of Proposed Method
Our proposed method also extracts URLs by executing redirection code that is not executed logically (e.g., dead code) because it exhaustively extracts redirection code by program slicing. When we access the URLs extracted with our method, as we discussed in the previous section, access patterns that are different from the usual are generated. For example, simultaneous access to the URLs prepared for Java 6 and Java 7 is respectively generated. Hence, attackers can detect and circumvent the proposed method by monitoring accesses from the same user and observing more than one request packets that should not be generated at the same time.
Extracting URLs from Benign Websites
We described our investigation of the presence of environment-dependent redirection code in malicious websites in Sect. 4.3. However, benign websites also use environment-dependent redirection code. Therefore, we investigated the presence of plugin-dependent redirection code in benign websites by crawling such websites using MineSpider. The target benign websites were 100 websites chosen randomly from the top 1 million websites on Alexa † . As a result, MineSpider found four websites using redirection code that change the destination URL depending on the presence of PDF or Flash profiled by browser fingerprinting. Our manual analysis revealed that the plugindependent code is used for access analysis and advertisements, and fetches web content depending on the presence of the plugin for correct operation on the client. These results indicate that we cannot detect malicious websites only by the presence of environment-dependent redirection code because benign websites also use environment-dependent redirection code. Our method is not a malicious detection method but a URL extraction method; hence, it needs to be combined with other methods of detecting malicious URLs.
Failure in Extracting Slices
We used a PDG constructed from static JavaScript analysis for program slicing. However, it is difficult to construct a PDG and extract slices accurately because of JavaScript features such as the language design standardized on objects, complicated variable references (e.g., prototype chain and scope chain), and dynamic objects (e.g., this object). We confirmed in our evaluation that certain side effects can occur such as an increase in slice computation time or failure in executing slices due to the extraction of slices with extra variables and functions. Chen et al. [24] proposed a method for dynamic slicing for Python programs by using Python bytecode and memory addresses instead of a PDG. They applied their method to several Python programs to evaluate the average slice ratio and analysis time but did not evaluate the extracted slice accuracy. However, as mentioned in Sect. 4.5, typical exploit kits contain 2.5 URLs in environment-dependent redirection code on average, and our method can extract 1.5 new URLs per crawl on average. Therefore, we can assume that implementing other methods will not necessarily increase the number of URLs discovered, even if we improve slice accuracy.
Limitations
Extracting Malware Distribution URLs
The proposed method uses a browser emulator that enables the browser implementation to be modified so that we can intercept the browser process and analyze JavaScript. However, the browser emulator does not execute exploit code that targets specific vulnerabilities of browsers because it cannot completely mimic the behavior of a browser and its vulnerabilities. Thus, our method cannot extract the malware distribution URL that is accessed by execution of exploit code.
Malicious URL Detection
Our objective was to extract URLs rather than detect malicious URLs. However, we argue that URLs extracted with our method can be detected as malicious by combining conventional methods such as malicious JavaScript detection [12] - [14] and malicious plugin detection [21] - [23] . Simply accessing these extracted URLs, on the other hand, might not enable web content to be downloaded because of IP cloaking and/or checking of a redirection chain based on the referrer and/or the cookie [4] , [5] . In the future, we will investigate a procedure for determining an environment to access these extracted URLs and a content download method that takes into account the redirection chain.
Identification of Plugin's Version Number Relevant to Redirection
We identified plugins relevant to redirections by applying the proposed method and showed the trend in plugins used for environment-dependent redirections in Sect. 5.1. Most redirections that depend on the plugins often use not only the presence but also the version number of plugins and change the destination URL accordingly. We can more effectively determine the plugin version that should be installed in a high-interaction honeyclient and that should be emulated in a low-interaction honeyclient by identifying boundary values of plugins used in branch statements for redirections. However, the version number used in a branch statement is often repeatedly split and joined by manipulating the major and minor version number as either string or integer variables. Different methods, e.g., symbolic execution [25] , are necessary for analysis since it is difficult to identify boundary values in complicated branch statements using our method alone.
Server-Side Browser Fingerprinting
Our method is an analysis method for client-side JavaScript; therefore, it is not focus on websites that change the destination URL using server-side browser fingerprinting. The information that can be acquired by server-side browser fingerprinting is limited compared to client-side browser fingerprinting, but attackers can launch drive-by download attacks without the disclosure of potential malicious URLs and target information by changing the destination URL on the server. De Mario et al. [26] proposed a method that automatically analyzes PHP code including the serverside browser fingerprinting of exploit kits and that discerns whether a parameter affects the behavior of the exploit kit by data flow analysis. However, this method is focused on the server-side code instead of the client-side code. For this reason, the method will miss how the URL parameters are generated from client-side JavaScript. It is also difficult to obtain exploit-kits' server-side source code. Therefore, we insist that our method remains beneficial for expanding information from the data that can be observed on the client side.
Related Work
Much research has been done on the analysis and detection of drive-by download attacks. Some detection methods use high-interaction honeyclients, whereas others use lowinteraction honeyclients. Several researchers have also proposed code analysis methods and malicious URL collection methods.
High-interaction Honeyclient
A high-interaction honeyclient is a vulnerable browser in a real environment that is used to detect malicious websites by monitoring processes and the file system and by detecting unintended processes (e.g., process and file generation) [8] - [11] . The use of a real vulnerable environment for website analysis means that it is possible to accurately detect attacks including zero-day attacks. However, the browser can only run a single environment at a time. This method, therefore, cannot follow redirections to malicious URLs and cannot detect attacks when an environment that is not specific to an attack target is used to analyze JavaScript code that changes the destination URL depending on the browser environment. In contrast, analysis using various environments has a high operational cost and also increases costs, such as analysis time and server resources, linearly with the number of new environments.
Low-interaction Honeyclient
A low-interaction honeyclient is not a real browser but a browser emulator that detects malicious websites by signature matching, which involves detecting malicious behaviors observed by monitoring the abuse of browser and plugin functions, and/or by applying machine learning based on static and dynamic features on the retrieved website [15] - [17] . This method is safer because it does not carry out an attack and is more scalable since it is possible to make changes to the browser implementation. To analyze JavaScript code statically and dynamically, MineSpider also adopts this method. However, current low-interaction honeyclients analyze only a single execution path of JavaScript at a time. This means that this method, like high-interaction honeyclients, cannot detect malicious URLs if it uses an environment that does not match the one being attacked.
Code Analysis
Many researchers have also proposed methods that improve coverage of JavaScript analysis because of a honeyclient's lack of analysis coverage. Wang et al. [18] proposed a method for extracting URLs in JavaScript by exhaustively executing functions using call graphs after slicing JavaScript code using an AST and program slicing. This method, however, cannot execute code that depends on the environment because the JavaScript interpreter used for the analysis was developed uniquely and has no implementation for browser plugins. In addition to the scalability of the implementation, this method introduces heavier analysis overhead than our method because this method extracts URLs of static links, such as an anchor tag and form tag, even if they are not necessary for detecting malicious websites. On the other hand, our method extract only URLs for using automatic redirections of a drive-by download while controlling analysis overhead by targeting only suspicious URLs. The analysis time of our method was up to 44% faster than that in [18] . In addition, we can infer that the analysis overhead of the extracted URLs is low because our method does not extract unnecessary URLs. Kolbitsch et al. [3] proposed a JavaScript multi-execution virtual machine as a way to explore multiple execution paths within a single execution so that environment-specific URLs will reveal themselves. However, this method has a fundamental limitation in terms of the environment because it is implemented in a real browser (Internet Explorer 9). If environment information (e.g., browser version number) is used in a URL, this method can only extract a URL for IE 9. Furthermore, a URL that can be observed with IE 9 is only extracted from a website using environment-dependent redirection code with sever-side browser fingerprinting. On the other hand, MineSpider can technically extract URLs that can be observed with various environments by changing the emulation settings. In this paper, we evaluated only the number of URLs extracted from environment-dependent redirection code with client-side browser fingerprinting because it is difficult to evaluate the number of URLs extracted from environment-dependent redirection code with serverside browser fingerprinting from the point of view of objectivity and repeatability.
Guided Crawling
Discovering malicious URLs from Web space requires an enormous amount of time. Many methods have been proposed to leverage crawling to discover malicious URLs by using search engines with seed URLs chosen not randomly but effectively. Akiyama et al. [27] proposed an effective blacklist URL generation method that increases the number of malicious URLs by discovering URLs in the neighborhood of a malicious seed URL using a search engine. Luca et al. [28] also proposed methods to discover malicious URLs similar to seed URLs by analyzing the web content, DNS traces, and link topology of known malicious URLs. The combination of our method and these methods can improve the observational coverage of malicious Web space.
Conclusion
We focused on redirection code that depends on the client environment and proposed a method for exhaustively analyzing redirection code for mining URLs. Our method uses static and dynamic code analysis to improve the analysis coverage and to counter evasion techniques such as code obfuscation and environment-dependent redirection. We conducted an experiment using HTTP communication data with over 19,000 malicious websites that were previously detected as drive-by downloads. The experimental results showed that MineSpider, a browser emulator that uses the proposed method, extracted more than 30,000 new URLs in a few seconds that conventional methods did not discover. In addition, by performing signature matching, we showed that the URLs extracted from malicious websites also had high levels of maliciousness. We believe that the proposed method can reduce the number of false negatives of malicious websites by maximizing the disclosure of malicious objects such as potential malicious URLs contained in websites.
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